What do the Dankali Afars wish, what are their specific problems with the current illegal regime of Eritrea? And why is the Eritrean constitution of 1997 insufficient and weakening? 

The linked article and video of EASE and Abdurahaman Sayed-Bohashem on Eritocracy discusses the questions above and provides sensible solutions to the serious issues. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, are other links in the post.


I will start with some of my views on the Eritrean constitution of 1997;

I completely agree with the quoted text below and most of what follows in the article written by the Eritrean Afar State in Exile (EASE). Why? Because the Eritrean constitution of 1997 is a typical third world country constitution that does not respect the indigenous cultures, religions, land rights and personal freedoms, rights and restrictions.
The human rights part of the constitution is almost a copy paste of the UN´s Civil and Political covenant which is not difficult to read at all http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx, It´s not creative. It´s a lazy peace of work, because they didn´t bother to sufficiently assess the needs and interests of the people themselves. Second, most of UN´s Civil and Political rights are declarations, they do not give much judicial guarantees at all, the reason being that the majority of world countries, third world countries, perceive them as Western inventions they refuse to live by. Agreeable or not, this is the reason why we do not yet have international human rights court for international individual subjects that can guarantee the enforcement of these rights vis a vis their mother land. Instead, it is made such that the respective countries should do the outmost to implement these regulations for the protection of their own civilians, native or adopted. In fact, it is expected that they should do way more than that. From a general and coarse perspective, most of UN´s human rights articles are toothless that cumulatively do have a relative significant political weight of what is not acceptable behaviour internationally. Some articles and conventions are more serious and widely accepted expressions of the faux pas than others. Breach with such special articles would result to presentation before ICC of personalities from any state body in question.

Further, the Eritrean constitution of 1997 does not solve the possible and natural conflict between religion and state at all, as it denies their role in the society. Constitutions are made to provide solutions to existing and future problems and conflict of interests. Its main objective is to solve conflict of interests by recognising the nature of its people, its political system and institutions. Such documents are also used as resource for expressed national culture, historical information (pre-constitution), current (post after the solutions have been provided) and for the future as a moral guidelines of its citizens and politicians of what is acceptable and not acceptable conduct in the country (national psyche and political culture). The 97 constitutions comes across as an enforcement of a Marxist and atheist ideologies. Secularity is a must common sense in the heterogenous Eritrea, however, religion has always been important for Eritreans. 90% of Eritreans are not Marxists, at least not by choice. On the contrary, the two semitic religious institutions have for more than 1000 years served as conservers of our history, traditions and impart our identities. The atheists and marxists in Eritrea make less than 10% of the civil society. For this reason, their powers and restrictions (only as institutions of public unavoidable power and as the oldest religious institutions that people still adhere to) should be explicitly and specifically mentioned in the constitution. They are not something that should and can be ignored. Since the Kunama religion is the most archaic in the country, it should also be mentioned as such in the constitution. For the powers of the smaller religions; Catholic, Protestant, Bahai, Jehova etc, it makes more sense that the freedoms and restrictions of their institutions follows the chapter on religious freedom, and freedom of conversion.

Considering the human rights section of a future post DIA Eritrean constitution, I completely agree with the EASE. The Afar have their customs since ages, so do the different sections of the low- and highland Eritrea. It gives a more effective judicial guarantee if one would rather see to modernise some of these local laws, than do alien impositions on them. Also, it would make more sense to have a greatly decentralised governing in the form of federations. Eritreans have always ruled themselves regionally, it gives more power to the subjects of the state. I think A/Sayed-BoHashem´s suggestion on how Eritrea should be governed post DIA (Eritocracy), is very sensible and in tact with the traditions, different mentalities and cultures of the Eritrean people. I wish you to think about it. Here it is; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nxD1z3sACMQ

I also agree with EASE that the 97 constitution is in breach with international law when it comes to land ownership. Land rights were one of the crucial push factors for the development of human rights in Europe and the Americas in late 1700s, that are now secured in the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Why this issue didn´t cross the minds of the lawmakers is beyond me, needless to say that lands in Eritrea have always been owned by the people, not by a king or state  http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cescr.pdf

From the EASE-Policy;
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3QNSN1T1AiwU0FJSGVLVDJxT3c/view?usp=sharing

"The unimplemented 1997 Constitution was born in a triumphalist spirit. Eritrea’s leaders were jubilant, intoxicated with the idea that they could do anything and imbued with the Marxist tenets that had carried them through their thirty year struggle for liberation. One of these ideas, built upon Stalinist concepts, was that Eritrea should build an “allembracing Eritrean identity”. The proposed constitution of the day was designed for majority ruling class, for the benefit of the ruling class, excluding the others from participating in the development of the country. Eritrea's ruling class (PFDJ) has used the motto of building unity and defending Eritrean sovereignty instead disguised its policy of Racism and Marginalization of Afar Eritreans of 23 years and counting.

Following are a few details concerning minority rights in Eritrea under the 1997 constitutional framework: · The 1997 Constitution contains no chapter on minority rights. · The rights of the national communities are nowhere guaranteed. The Constitution neither provides for any measures for autonomy or self-government of the nationalities, nor does the Constitution provide for guarantees for the small nationalities to participate in central institutions of the state. · Art. 31 of the Constitution ensures Eritrea’s central institutions will be dominated by large nationalities as they are now. · The 1997 Constitution contains no guarantees for the autonomy or rights of the regional authorities. Art. 1(5) gives the Central Authorities full control over the regions, with “carte blanche” over Afar economies, resources, governing structures and societies. Centralized power has been used to reorganize the regions and depreciate their powers and territories. Dankalia, for example, has been reduced in size and parts of it subjected to rule by others.

The reality of the 1997 Constitution is that the excessive centralization of Art 1(5) creates and makes Eritrea’s small nationalities dependent on the large nationalities. · Art 23.2 of the 1997 Constitution declares "All lands and all natural resources below and above the surface of the territory of Eritrea belong to the State. The interests citizens shall have in land shall be determined by law”. This article expropriates the indigenous rights of Afar people to the soil, contrary to international law. It allows the central authorities to appropriate the traditional lands and resources of the Afar pastoralists and sell them to foreign resource extraction companies. It allows the large nationalities to displace the small nationalities from their rightful and guaranteed traditional lands and pursuits. For the reasons stated above, the 1997 Constitution is deeply problematic for Afar people. Suffice it to say here that the Afar will not accept the 1997 Constitution without modifications tailored to Afar concerns. Eritrea is a deeply diverse polity. It contains ten nationalities, two of which are large and dominant, eight of which are small and marginalized (deeply marginalized in the Afar case).

Eritrea’s nationalities are distinguished by ancient and distinct languages, which are superimposed on cleavages of religion, economy, culture and more generally way of life."